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There is a large body of literature documenting both a preference for immediacy and a tendency to
procrastinate. O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,b, 2001) and Choi et al. (2005) model these behaviors
as the two faces of the same phenomenon. In this paper, we use a combination of lab, field, and survey
evidence to study whether these two types of behavior are indeed linked. To measure immediacy we
had subjects choose between a series of smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards. Both rewards were
paid with a check in order to control for transaction costs. To measure procrastination we use the subjects'
actual behavior in cashing the check and completing tasks on time. Our results lend support to the
hypothesis that subjects who have a preference for immediacy are indeed more likely to procrastinate.
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luigi.zingales@gsb.uchicago.eduThere is a large body of experimental literature documenting the tendency for people to exhibit
very strong preferences for immediacy (e.g. Thaler, 1981; Benzion et al., 1989; Kirby, 1997; Coller
and Williams, 1999; Shui and Ausubel, 2005; Ashraf et al., 2006).1 At the same time, there
is a small, but growing, body of literature showing that people tend to procrastinate (Ariely
and Wertenbroch, 2002; DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006; Choi et al., 2006). O'Donoghue
and Rabin (1999a,b, 2001) and Choi et al. (2005) model these behaviors as two faces of the
same phenomenon. Highly impatient individuals overweight immediate costs vis-¶ a-vis delayed
bene¯ts, procrastinating in activities where costs are upfront, while overindulging in activities
where costs are delayed with respect to bene¯ts.
While the link between these two phenomena is really at the heart of this literature, we are
not aware of any paper testing the connection. In this paper, we design an experiment to achieve
this goal. We ask a large sample of MBAs students who have completed a series of games and
won an amount between $0 and $300 whether they want to receive this amount now or in two
weeks. Instead of paying them in cash, as is common in the literature, we choose to pay them
with a check. This enables us not only to keep constant the delivery method, but also to follow
the timing of their decision to cash the check and measure their degree of procrastination with
the actual behavior in cashing the check.
Payment with the check makes the decision of when to optimally accept the prize less
straightforward. In the acceptance decision, a rational individual will take into consideration
his/her procrastination in cashing the check. To analyze this problem formally, we apply the
Choi et al. (2005) model of 401K enrollment to our context and derive the optimal acceptance
decision as a function of the amount of the prize and individual characteristics. In the model,
we show that if agents are impatient, as in Laibson (1994) and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a),
these individuals will also tend to delay the cashing of the check (they tend to procrastinate),
even after controlling for the amount of the prize. As in O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,b, 2001),
the intuition is as follows. Agents with a strong present bias are more likely to postpone the
unpleasant task of cashing the check. At the same time, when faced with the decision when to
receive the check, they will value more the psychological bene¯t of receiving it immediately.
We test the predictions of this model with our data. The correlation between impatience and
procrastination is positive but not signi¯cant. One possible reason for this lack of signi¯cance is
that procrastination and impatience are indeed not linked. Alternatively, heterogeneity in other
1See Frederick et al. (2002) for a recent review.
2individual characteristics may cloud the relation of interest. In particular, the model suggests
that heterogeneity in the risk of losing the check or in the cost of going to the next ATM to cash
it can induce a negative correlation between impatience and our measure of procrastination,
which could a®ect the experimental results.
To address this problem, we use two other measures of procrastination that are not a®ected
by these biases. In the course of the project, we asked the subjects to complete two surveys.
One was mandatory as part of a class, the other was optional. Both needed to be completed
by a certain deadline in order for them to receive feedback. Hence, as alternative measures of
procrastination, we can use the closeness to the deadline each survey is ¯lled.
When we use these measures, we ¯nd a positive correlation between impatience and pro-
crastination, regardless of the survey we use. Moreover, since procrastination is measured with
noise, as individuals may be busier in some periods or may lose the check, in our last speci¯ca-
tion, we instrument the procrastination measure of cashing the check with the behavior in ¯lling
the surveys. Consistent with O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) and Choi et al. (2005), the in-
strumental variable regression shows a positive and signi¯cant relation between procrastination
and impatience.
As a ¯nal test of the O'Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and Choi et al. (2005) approach, we
test whether \naÄ ³ve" procrastinators behave di®erently as theory suggests. Not anticipating
their future procrastination, naÄ ³ve subjects should overestimate the future value of the check,
increasing the likelihood they would choose to receive it at a later day.
To test this prediction we develop a proxy of naÄ ³vit¶ e by comparing the subjects' answers
to the question \Are you a procrastinator?" to their actual behavior in cashing the check and
answering the surveys. The results support O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,b, 2001): naÄ ³ve
procrastinators have lower subjective discount rates than sophisticated ones.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the experiment and the data
used. Section II models the decision to accept the money today or tomorrow in the presence
of costs of cashing the check. Section III tests the predictions of the model by using our
experimental data. Section IV concludes.
3I Experimental Design
In this paper we utilize data from the Templeton Chicago MBA longitudinal study (TCMLS).
As part of a long term research project on individual characteristics and economic success, the
TCMLS collects data from the entire cohort of 2008 MBA students at the Graduate School of
Business of Chicago University (see Reuben et al., 2007).
As part of a required class, all the students were asked to ¯ll a survey and play some games.
After that, an additional voluntary survey was administered. While participation to the ¯rst
two events was mandatory, the Institutional Review Board at the University of Chicago required
that subjects be o®ered the opportunity to opt out from the study by not consenting to the use
of their data for research purposes. Out of 550 MBA students, 548 ¯lled the survey and 544
played the games. 502 (92.28%) consented to the use of both their survey and game data. In
this paper we use data from these two sources plus admission data obtained from the GSB (also
with the students' consent). Each of these data sources as well as the subject pool is brie°y
described below.
A Surveys and data from the university
In addition to the experiment data, we use data from two surveys and from the admission o±ce
of the University. Subjects completed two online surveys. The ¯rst was a compulsory survey
assigned two weeks before the experiment and due at the time of the experiment. Filling it on
time was one of the requirements for passing the course. The second survey was given to them
a few weeks after the experiment. This survey was voluntary but, as an incentive, subjects who
completed the survey on time received personalized feedback designed to improve their future
job performance.
The surveys are designed to acquire demographic data and measure various personality traits
(all the questions used are available in Reuben et al., 2007). In this paper we concentrate only
on two variables: trust and cognitive ability. We want to control for trust because it is possible
that individuals with very low trust do not trust the experimenters. In that is the case, they will
be less willing to wait two weeks for payment and more prompt to cash the check. Trust was
measured using the standard question from the World Values Survey.2 Table 1 shows sample
statistics for this variable: 54% of the students responded that most people can be trusted.
2The answer \Most people can be trusted" to the question \Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?". The other answers are \Can't
be too careful" and \Don't know".
4In our analysis, we also control for cognitive re°ection as it has been shown to be related to
discount rates (Frederik, 2005; Benjamin et al., 2006). Following Frederik (2005), we measure
cognitive abilities using the Cognitive Re°ection Test (CRT). Speci¯cally, we ask four mathe-
matical reasoning problems and use as a score the number of correct answers.3 Sample statistics
for the CRT scores in our sample are in Table 1: The average student answered 2.5 out of 4
questions correctly.
We also kept track of how many days it took students to complete the two surveys. On
average, students took 9 days to complete the ¯rst (mandatory) survey and 33 to complete the
second (voluntary) one.
Finally, we also use information provided by the University. It includes additional de-
mographic characteristics such number of clubs the student is member of, marital status at
enrollment, etc.
B Experiment
The main data come from a laboratory experiment, which consisted of two lotteries, four games
and an auction played in the following order: lottery with losses, asset market game, trust
game, competition game, chocolate auction, social dilemma game, and lottery without losses.
The games were programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and played in four batches in four
large classrooms.
In order to give students an incentive to take their decisions seriously, we paid them according
to their performance. We randomly drew one of the four games and two lotteries and paid them
according to their performance in that game.
At the end of the session, a message on the screen announced to the subjects their ¯nal
payo®s and o®ered them to make a ¯nal choice between receiving their payment the day of
the experiment or receiving a larger amount two weeks later. In total, 544 MBA students
participated in the experiment and earned on average $78.32 in addition to a $20 show-up fee.
In this paper we concentrate on two tasks designed to measure impatience: the subject's last
3The questions are \1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost?"; \2. If you °ipped a fair coin 3 times, what is the probability that it would land \heads" at
least once?"; \3. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets?"; \4. Two cars are on a collision course, traveling towards each other in the same lane. Car A
is traveling 70 miles an hour. Car B is traveling 80 miles an hour. How far apart are the cars one minute before
they collide?"
5choice and the chocolate auction. Both tasks are explained in detail below. A short summary of
the procedures and the instructions of these tasks are available in Appendix A. For a description
of the other games see Reuben et al. (2007).
B.1 Impatience over money
In order to measure impatience we elicit the subjects' short-run discount rate. This was done by
giving subjects a series of simple choices of the following type: receive x dollars today or receive
(1 + r)x dollars in two weeks, where x equals their earnings in the experiment. Only the 495
subjects who earned a positive amount made this decision. Of this 495, only 460 consented to
the use of their data. Hence, the maximum number of observation in our sample is 460. When
additional constraints further limit the size of our sample we will explain them.
Each subject answered thirteen questions where r varied from 0 to 0.12 in steps of 0.01.
Thereafter, one of the questions was randomly selected to be paid.
If, for a given r and x, a subject prefers x dollars today, we can infer that she is willing to
sacri¯ce r% of earnings in order to receive the payment today instead than in two weeks. Thus,
by varying r and observing the point where subjects switch from payment today to payment in
two weeks we get a precise measure of each subject's discount rate. We chose this procedure as
it is not only incentive compatible, but also simple to understand.
Figure IA plots the discount rate (over two weeks) at which students switched towards
the late delivery. Roughly one third of the students switch at 1%, which is the level a rational
exponential discounter is expected to choose. Two thirds, however, exhibit a very large discount
rate with roughly 10% of the students not switching even at the 12% rate, which in annual
terms corresponds to a discount rate of 3,686%. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for this
variable, where we impose a discount rate equal to 13% to all the students who do not switch
even for r = 12%.
Since students confronted this choice with a di®erent amount of money at stake, to isolate
the di®erence in their impatience we need to partial out the e®ect of the initial amount of cash.
Indeed, when we run a regression (not reported) of the discount rate on the level of money
at stake, the switching point choice is heavily in°uenced by the amount of money at stake:
the larger the amount, the lower the discount rate. Figure IB and Figure IC show that this
relationship is non-linear: the best ¯t is obtained using the logarithm of the level of money at
stake rather than the level. Hence, in the remaining part of the paper whenever we will use the
6switching point as a measure of impatience, we will control for the logarithm of the amount of
money at stake.
Interestingly, the percentage of people switching at a 1% rate (i.e., supposedly rational
exponential discounters) does not change with the amount of money at stake. This amount
only impacts the switching point of the subjects with high discount rates.
B.2 Time to cash a check
In order to keep the transaction costs constant over both payment options we paid subjects
by dropping a check in their mailfolders. Checks were distributed either the same day of the
experiment or two weeks later at the same time of day. Note that payment was always done
during a day in which subjects had to attend class and thus be present at the university.
Mailfolders are easily accessed and are usually checked on a daily basis. Utilizing a check not
only homogenizes transaction costs, it also gives us a measure of procrastination. Namely, the
number of days a subject takes to cash the check.
The values for this variable are reported in Figure IIA. On average it takes 3.7 weeks for a
student to cash the check. The last check was cashed after 205 days. 37 students (7%) did not
cash the check. We set the cashing date for these students at 206 days.
As we will discuss in the model, the time to cash a check is not a pure measure of procras-
tination. First of all, the economic incentive to cash the check in the presence of a cost of going
to the bank will be a®ected by the amount of money at stake. Second, people might di®er on
how busy they are and how costly it is to go to the bank.
Figure IIB plots the check cashing time on the level of money at stake, while Figure IIC
plots the check cashing time on the logarithm of the level of money at stake. Not surprisingly,
people with a larger check cash it sooner. As Figure IIC shows, a good ¯t is obtained using the
logarithm of the level of money at stake. This impression is con¯rmed by a formal regression test
(not reported). Hence, in the following whenever we will use the switching point as a measure
of impatience we will control for the logarithm of the level of money at stake.
In Table 2 we regress the time to cash the check on the logarithm of the amount of money
at stake and a measure of how busy these students are, proxied by the number of clubs in which
they are involved (column II). As expected, the busier they are the longer it takes for them
to cash the check. In column III we insert their gender and their marital status (interacted
with their gender). Consistent with the most trite stereotype, males who are married are less
7busy and cash their checks sooner, while females who are married are more busy and cash their
checks later (albeit this latter e®ect is not statistically signi¯cant). Another reason that might
induce students to cash early is the fear that the amount of money will not be paid. To this
purpose we use their level of trust, which we measured in the survey asking them the typical
World Value Survey question. People who trust more cash their checks later, but this e®ect is
not statistically signi¯cant.
After partialling out the level of busyness, the time it takes to cash a check can be interpreted
as a measure of procrastination. To check whether this is the case in column IV and V we insert
two di®erent measures of procrastination: the time it took a student to ¯ll in the ¯rst survey and
the time it took to ¯ll in the second one. Notice that these surveys are administered at di®erent
times, so idiosyncratic commitments should cancel out. As the last two columns suggest, the
level of procrastination seems to be correlated across activities. We will return to this issue
later.
B.3 Impatience over goods
There is a debate in the literature on how best to measure present-biased preferences. Of the
23 papers we were able to locate that attempt to measure this bias from subjects' real (not
hypothetical) choices, 14 use money. Measuring present-bias with money, however, has a major
drawback. As long as subjects have access to the credit market (and we know that 90% of our
students do because we asked them whether their credit card was maxed out), they are strictly
better o® leaving their award money with us and borrowing on their credit card to ¯nance any
consumption needs for an amount equal to the prize money. That two thirds of Chicago MBA
students (who are pretty good at spotting arbitrage opportunities) exhibit a strong preference
to receive the money now suggests other forces are at play.
One possibility is that the impatience measured with money is pure noise. Another hy-
pothesis is these choices re°ect the level of impatience individuals have in receiving a reward.
McClure et al. (2004), for instance, ¯nd that subjects' brain exhibit the typical reaction of sat-
isfaction when a subject receives an Amazon gift certi¯cate, which he cannot immediately turn
into consumption. They interpret this ¯nding as evidence that the brain of impatient people
responds to receiving the reward, independent of the consumption associated with it. If this is
the case, monetary rewards are as good as rewards in kind.
An alternative approach to measure impatience is to use a consumption good. In doing so,
8however, there are two problems. The ¯rst is that we cannot use the same strategy used with
money because the marginal utility of consumption of a speci¯c good might drop fast. For
this reason, instead of asking whether you prefer one piece of chocolate today to 1.1 pieces of
chocolate in two weeks, we chose to auction a large Toblerone chocolate bar (market value of
approximately $3.00) with di®erent delivery dates.4
In Table 1, we report the students' bids for chocolate delivered at di®erent dates. On average,
the price o®ered for a Toblerone with immediate delivery is $1.83 (well below the market price).
The average price o®ered for a Toblerone in a week is $1.29 and for a Toblerone in two weeks is
$1.10.
The second problem in measuring impatience with a good is that, while at the aggregate
level the data show a very nice behavior, when we come to individual data this is no longer
the case. Consider the model of present-biased preferences by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and





Figure III plots the ¯ of chocolate, while Table 1 reports the summary statistics for this
variable. Computed with the aggregate data, ¯ equals 0.83, while computed with the individual
data, ¯ equals 1.11, i.e., there is no decreasing discount rates on average. In fact, 95 students
(almost a third of the sample) exhibit a positive ¯, which is the opposite of bias toward the
present. We attribute this problem to two reasons.
First, there are 148 zero bids, which make it impossible for us to compute ¯, forcing us to
4Subjects were randomly divided into groups of eight and one bar was auctioned within each group. Although
only one chocolate per group was auctioned, subjects participated in three second-price seal-bid auctions. The
¯rst auction was for a chocolate bar delivered the day of the experiment, the second auction was for a chocolate
bar delivered one week later, and the third auction was for a chocolate bar delivered two weeks later. After the
third auction, one of the auctions (and thus a delivery time) was chosen at random. Subjects submitted a bid, in
dollars, for each of the three auctions. Bids were made sequentially but with no feedback in-between bids. The
chocolate was given to the highest bidder of the randomly-chosen auction. The chocolate delivery was organized
in the following way: chocolates delivered the day of the experiment were delivered when the experiment ¯nished.
Chocolates delivered in later weeks were distributed at the end of a class that coincided with the weekday and
time of the experiment. Since the class is mandatory, any costs associated with the consumption of the chocolate
at the di®erent delivery times are bound to be very similar. Furthermore, chocolates were distributed at similar
situations. Both the experiment and the classes were in the afternoon, last the same amount of time, and require
intellectual e®ort. Thus, for most subjects, the consumption of the chocolate ought to provide a similar utility
at all delivery times.
9lose almost a third of the sample. Most of these are from people who do not like the chocolate
at all or do not like it now (maybe because they are full).
Second, when we measure impatience with a consumption good not equally desired through-
out the day, there is an option value implicit in future deliveries. If I am not hungry, I do not
value the chocolate now very much, but I might value receiving it in the future, when there is
at least a possibility that I will be hungry.
As a result, the data obtained in this way are much more noisy and this noise is likely to be
correlated with the taste for chocolate. If we test this we indeed ¯nd that the magnitude of the
¯ is negatively and statistically signi¯cantly correlated with the desire for chocolate measured
by a subject's bid for chocolate at time zero.
In Table 3 we test the correlation between our two measures of impatience, after we control
for the amount of money at stake, which has an e®ect on the monetary measure of impatience.
As expected, the impatience rate measured with money is negatively correlated with the ¯
computed from the chocolate bids (more impatient subjects will have a lower ¯s and higher
discount rates). The coe±cient, however, is not statistically signi¯cant. To see how much this
is due to the noise introduced in the chocolate choice by the low bids for chocolate, in column II
we include only those observations where the initial bid for chocolate was at least $1. Consistent
with the noise explanation, the coe±cient doubles and it is now statistically signi¯cant.
These results suggest that these two measures are indeed correlated, but this correlation is
garbled by the di®erent (temporary and not temporary) desire for the good. Given this problem
and the fact that we lose almost a third of the sample by using the chocolate based measure, in
the rest of the paper we will use the monetary measure.
II Model
O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) show how present-biased preferences lead individuals to pro-
crastinate costly actions. To test this link we need to formally understand how the two concepts
are linked in the context of our experiment. To this purpose we adapt Choi et al. (2005) model of
401K enrollment and analyze the subjects' decision to delay their payment taking into account
their own check-cashing behavior.
In the model, we consider the check as the `carrier of reward'. In other words, as in McClure
et al. (2004) utility is derived from receiving the check and is independent of when the check is
10actually cashed. This assumption is consistent with subjects exhibiting a present-bias preference
even over money.
A Cashing the check
Solving the model by backward induction, we ¯rst analyze the decision to cash the check. As
a result of the above assumption, the cashing of the check becomes simply a chore that has to
be done at some point (as the 401K enrollment in Choi et al., 2005). We model the decision of
when to cash the check as the result of a dynamic optimization problem in which the individual
decides whether to incur the cost of cashing the check today or in some future date.
We assume individuals have quasi-hyperbolic preferences so that their discount function is
D(t) = 1 if t = 0 and D(t) = ¯±t if t ¸ 1. We further assume that ± = 1 for two reasons. First,
long run discounting ought to be negligible in the time framework considered here. Second, at
the time of the experiment bank interest rates were extremely low (less of 1% annual rate on
the checking account), making the cost of the interest forgone trivial.
Given the absence of a signi¯cant interest forgone, we model the cost of not cashing the
check as the probability 0 < p < 1 of losing it. Not only this cost is very realistic (7% of the
checks were not cashed after 6 months), but it also captures in a continuous fashion the fact
that checks lose validity six months after they are issued.
Finally, we assume that cashing the check has a cost ct drawn at the beginning of each
period t from a uniform distribution with support [0;¹ c]. As a result, when making her decision
in period t, an individual knows the value of ct but not its future realizations. This assumption
is meant to capture some variability in the cost of cashing the check. The day a subject has
to go to the bank for other reasons or visit the book store (which is opposite a bank), her cost
of cashing can be trivial (even zero). When she is studying for an exam or very busy in other
social activity, her cost might be very high.
By assuming that ct is known at time t the model also captures the possibility that an
individual wants to receive the check today because she is afraid to forget about it in the future
(this would correspond to a very low c0).
After receiving the check, in each period t a subject has to decide whether to cash the check
that period or to delay the decision to the next period. In other words, after receiving the check
for an amount S > 0, a subject minimizes the following current discounted loss function V :




ct if check is cashed
¯[pS + (1 ¡ p)L] if check is not cashed
where L is the individual's expected future costs if she does not cash the check and p the
probability of losing it.
As we show in Appendix B, the solution for this problem takes the form of a cuto® rule.
An individual cashes the check in period t if the realized cost in that period is smaller than c¤,
otherwise she postpones the decision until the next period.
Lemma 1 The optimal cuto® rule is given by
(3) c¤(¯;p;S;¹ c) =
p
(p¹ c)2 + 2(1 ¡ p)p(2 ¡ ¯)¯S¹ c ¡ p¹ c
(1 ¡ p)(2 ¡ ¯)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Given c¤ < ¹ c we can calculate the expected number of future periods that an individual
takes to cash the check ¿, considering that only checks which are not lost are cashed
(4) ¿ =
(1 ¡ p)(¹ c ¡ c¤)c¤
(c¤ + p(¹ c ¡ c¤))2;
and the expected value to the individual of receiving a check for an amount S (including the
expected cost of cashing it), which we denote as ¾(S)5
(5) ¾(S) =
c¤







The following proposition follows:
Proposition 1 If the check is not negligibly small, the lower the ¯ (i.e, the more impatient the
individual is) and the smaller the size of the check S, the more time an individual takes to cash
the check.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The main intuition is the same as in O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) and Choi et al. (2005).
When choosing between cashing today and cashing tomorrow, an impatient individual will
discount heavily the cost of cashing tomorrow, so she will resort to cashing the check today only
for very low realization of c. Hence, on average, an impatient individual will cash the check
5For c
¤ ¸ ¹ c, the check is always cashed in the ¯rst period, and therefore, ¿ = 0 and ¾(S) = S ¡
¹ c
2
12later. In contrast, the higher the amount of the check, the higher is the cost of losing it. This
risk will lead a subject to cash the check earlier.
The reason why the result is not true for all values of S, but only for non-trivial values
is that for very small values of S very impatient individuals will postpone the cashing for so
long that most of them will lose the check. Hence, the expected cashing time conditional on
cashing might be smaller than the expected cashing time conditional of cashing for more patient
individuals.
In Appendix B we argue that the condition for Proposition 1 is satis¯ed in our sample,
otherwise at least 51% of the people would have lost the check, while the actual amount is at
most 7%.
B Getting the check
Having derived the optimal check-cashing behavior, we now analyze how subjects choose the
timing of the reward as a function of their present bias. At the end of the experiment, subjects
choose to receive either a check for S right away or a check for S(1 + r) the following period,
where for simplicity we assume each period to last for two weeks. Clearly, the value of receiving
the check today versus a period from now depends upon the optimal cashing behavior. We start
by analyzing the choice of a sophisticated individual, i.e., an individual who is aware that in
the future she will postpone the cashing decision.
B.1 Sophisticated subjects
If an individual takes the check and cashes it in period 0, she receives S ¡ c0. If she takes the
check in period 0 but does not cash it, she receives (1¡p)¾(S). Finally, if she takes the check in
period 1, she receives ¯¾(S +rS). Therefore an individual will choose a smaller check in period








Conditions (6) illustrate that there are two reasons to prefer a check today. The ¯rst one is
that today's realization of the cost c0 is so low that a subject wants to get the check and cash
it now when her cost is low, rather than wait to receive it in the future, when she expects the
cost of cashing to be much higher and she runs the cost of losing it. In other words, if I know
I have to go to the bank today for other reasons, I prefer to get the check today and cash it
13rather than wait for two weeks and run the cost of losing it, even if by waiting for two weeks
I receive a slightly larger amount. This intuition is not unique to subjects with a present bias,
but it is common to rational exponential discounters. So we have
Corollary 1 Even if o®ered a positive interest rate r, an individual with ¯ = 1 will not neces-
sarily delay receiving the check.
The second reason a subject might choose to receive her check right away is that she has a
very high bias toward the present (i.e. a very low ¯). Indeed, combining (6) with (3), (5) we
obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The lower is the interest rate o®ered r and the lower is ¯ (i.e, the more im-
patient a player), the higher is the probability that an individual will prefer a check right away
rather than next period.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 con¯rms the validity of our method to elicit the degree of present bias in
preferences. The interest rate at which an individual will switch is a function of her ¯. The
intuition is straightforward. A higher ¯ makes the delayed delivery more valuable as does a
higher interest rate r.
By contrast, the relation between the delivery timing and the amount of the check is not so
straightforward. In fact, we have
Corollary 2 For high interest rates r there is a negative relation between the amount of the
check S and the probability of accepting a check right away rather than the following period. For
low interest rates this relation is positive.
Proof. See Appendix B.
For high interest rates, the relation is as expected. Higher amount makes delaying the reward
more valuable (because it yields a higher interest) and so makes the delayed choice more likely.
This is no longer true for small interest rates because the probability of losing the check becomes
relatively more important than the interest accumulated on the check.
B.2 NaÄ ³ve subjects
All the above results were derived under the assumption that subjects were aware of their degree
of present bias in the future (i.e., they were sophisticated). Some individuals, however, can be
14naÄ ³ve. That is, they have a ¯ · 1 in all future periods, but they are not aware of this. They
think that in the future they will behave as if they had a ¯ = 1.
Lets denote ¾e(S;¯e) as the expected value of the check given a belief ¯e a subject has about
her own future level of impatience. Then we have that a naÄ ³ve individual will choose immediate








Comparing (7) with (6) leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Generally for ¯ < 1, the probability that a naÄ ³ve individual prefers a check
right away rather than next period is less than the probability of a sophisticated individual with
the same characteristics. All the other comparative statics are the same as for sophisticated
individuals.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Not internalizing their future procrastinating behavior, naÄ ³ve impatient individuals will think
that they will cash the check faster that they actually do and this leads them to value more a
delayed delivery than sophisticated impatient individuals.
III Regression Results
The model predicts that there should be a correlation between the rate of impatience inferred
from the timing a student chooses to receive her check and her degree of procrastination, com-
puted as the delay in cashing the check. Table 4 tests this hypothesis with the data from our
experiment. Since the impatience rate is censored from below at r · 1% and above at r ¸ 13%,
we estimate these regressions with a Tobit model. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses.
In column I we regress each student's subjective two-week discount rate on a measure of
procrastination. As proxy for procrastination, in this speci¯cation we use the number of weeks
it took a subject to cash her check, excluding the 31 students who never cashed it (and consented
to the study). Students who delayed cashing the check have a higher discount rate, but this
e®ect is both economically small and statistically insigni¯cant. One extra week delay in cashing
the check is associated with only a 0.04 percentage points increase in their discount rate.
15In column II we repeat the previous regression including also the students who have not
cashed the check, with a value of delay equal to the maximum one (29 weeks). The coe±cient
almost doubles, but it is still economically small and statistically insigni¯cant.
In column III we control for a measure of cognitive ability. There are several reasons for
including this control. First, in experimental research, measures of IQ have been linked to
patience and delayed grati¯cation (Mischel, 1974; Shoda et al., 1990; Benjamin et al., 2006).
It is possible that individuals with higher cognitive abilities understand the question (implied
interest rates) better than individuals with lower cognitive abilities. Alternatively, the causality
could be reversed, as Mischel (1974) and Shoda et al. (1990) seem to suggest: individuals who
are patient, may work harder, and achieve higher grades. When we introduce the CRT score in
our regression we ¯nd that, consistent with Frederik (2005), people with higher cognitive ability
have lower discount rates.6 This e®ect, however, does not impact our coe±cient of interest.
In column IV we control for the World Values Survey measure of trust. In spite of our e®ort
to equate the way the delivery of the reward was done, we ¯nd that people with higher trust
have lower discount rates. Nevertheless, our coe±cient of interest is unchanged.
A Alternative measures of procrastination
Table 4 fails to show an economic and statistically signi¯cant relation between procrastination
and impatience. One possible interpretation is that this re°ects the true nature of the data.
As suggested by most of the psychology literature, procrastination and impatience might not
be two faces of the same phenomenon. Alternatively, this result might be simply the outcome
of an excessive amount of noise in the data. In the model we assume that all individuals had
the same risk of losing the check (p) and the same distribution of costs of cashing the check
(uniform between 0 and ¹ c).
In reality, subjects are likely to di®er on both these dimensions. If we introduce this hetero-
geneity, with people di®ering in the cost of cashing the check and/or in their absent-mindedness
(i.e., in the probability of losing the check), the theoretical model exhibits a negative correlation
between the discount rate and the time to cash the check. This suggests that the unobserved
6Frederik (2005) suggests an alternative possible interpretation of this correlation between patience and cog-
nitive abilities: CRT problems generate an incorrect \intuitive" answer. Impatient individuals are more likely
to respond impulsively and make mistakes. We tested for this e®ect by isolating the answer to the one question
without any intuitive wrong answer (the two cars crashing). The result is the same.
16heterogeneity induces an attenuation bias in our estimated correlation between impatience and
procrastination.
One solution to this problem is to try to ¯nd proxies for heterogeneity in p and ¹ c. In Table 2
we try to control for possible variation in the costs of cashing the check and the probability
of losing the check. The low explanatory value of these proxies, however, suggests that we do
not have good measures for variation in p and ¹ c. Indeed, when we add these proxies (marital
status, club membership) to the speci¯cation in Table 4 (not reported), these variables are never
signi¯cant and do not impact our variable of interest.
An alternative empirical strategy is to ¯nd some measures of procrastination which do not
su®er from these problems. To this purpose we can use the days it took a subject to complete
the two surveys we administered. These measures are likely to be uncorrelated with the cost of
cashing the check and also with the probability of losing it.
In the ¯rst two columns of Table 5, we report the Tobit regressions of each subject's sub-
jective two-week discount rate on these two alternative measures of procrastination. In the ¯rst
column we regress each subject's subjective two-week discount rate on the number of days she
waited before answering the ¯rst survey. One standard deviation change in the completion time
of the survey (which corresponds to 5 days) is associated with a 62 basis points increase in
the subjective discount rate over the two-week period. The e®ect is statistically signi¯cant at
the 10% level. When we use the second survey the e®ect is economically similar: one standard
deviation change in the completion time of the second survey (which corresponds to 17 days)
is associated with a 61 basis points increase in the subjective discount rate over the two-week
period. The e®ect is statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level.
Since these procrastination proxies are also measured with noise, as individuals may be bus-
ier in some periods (the surveys had to be ¯lled in di®erent time periods), we use an alternative
speci¯cation to verify that our results are robust. In Column III of Table 5, we instrument
the procrastination measure of cashing the check with the behaviors in ¯lling the two surveys.
The results show a positive and signi¯cant relation between procrastination and impatience,
con¯rming our previous results. Consistent with the attenuation bias hypothesis (which should
be reduced or eliminated by the instrumental variables), the e®ect is quantitatively much big-
ger. A one standard deviation delay in cashing the check (which corresponds to 4.4 weeks) is
associated with a 372 basis points increase in the subjective discount rate (73% of the sample
mean). The e®ect is statistically signi¯cant at the 10% level.
17These results support the link between procrastination and impatience, hypothesized in
O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,b, 2001).
B NaÄ ³vit¶ e
As a ¯nal test of the O'Donoghue and Rabin (2001) and Choi et al. (2005) models, we elaborate
a proxy of naÄ ³vit¶ e of the subjects. The model suggests that naÄ ³ve subjects should exhibit a
lower discount rate because by underestimating their procrastination they overvalue the delayed
delivery.
To test this prediction in the general survey we asked students whether they considered
themselves to be procrastinators. We then compare their answer with their actual behavior to
determine whether they are naÄ ³ve in their assessment. Speci¯cally, we use two de¯nitions of
naÄ ³vit¶ e. NaÄ ³ve procrastinator (survey) is a subject who answers negatively to the question \Do
you tend to procrastinate?" and at the same time took more time than the median subject to
complete the survey. NaÄ ³ve procrastinator (survey & check) is a subject who answers negatively
to the abovementioned question and at the same time took more time than the median subject
to complete both the survey and to cash the check. Table 1 reports the frequency of the subjects
who are naÄ ³ve, according to these two de¯nitions. In the entire sample there are 11% or 7%
naÄ ³ve procrastinators, depending on whether we use the ¯rst or the second de¯nition.
Table 6 reports the result of inserting the two di®erent measures of naÄ ³vit¶ e in the speci¯cation
of column III of Table 5. As predicted by the model, the coe±cients of naÄ ³vit¶ e are negative
and signi¯cant in both speci¯cations. The e®ect is economically large. If we de¯ne naÄ ³ve
procrastinators as those who did not consider themselves procrastinators, but behaved as such
when cashing the check, being naÄ ³ve results in a subjective discount rate 291 basis points lower
than the discount rate of an otherwise similar subject.
Since this measure of naÄ ³vit¶ e relies on just one action to classify an individual as naÄ ³ve,
it might be prone to many mistakes. For this reason, in Column II we use a more restrictive
de¯nition of naÄ ³vit¶ e, which relies on two separate actions to classify a person as naÄ ³ve. Consistent
with our ¯rst measure being more noisy, the estimated coe±cient increases. NaÄ ³ve subjects now
have a discount rate which is 645 basis point lower than the discount rate of otherwise similar
subjects.
The insertion of this control does not reduce the coe±cient on the procrastination variable.
18In fact, consistent with our empirical speci¯cation capturing more of the features of the model,
the coe±cient of procrastination on impatience increases by 37%.
IV Conclusions
One of the main contributions of behavioral economics to the study of human behavior is its
reductio ad unum, its attempt to explain several phenomena psychologists classify as distinct
on the basis of a common underlying principle. Nowhere has this attempt been more successful
than in the case of the relation between present-bias preferences and procrastination. As far
as we know, however, this relation has not been tested empirically. In this paper we do so,
designing a combination of a laboratory and ¯eld experiment where the two behaviors can be
analyzed and we ¯nd evidence supporting this relation.
Another important contribution of the recent behavioral economics literature has been the
introduction of the distinction between sophisticated individuals and naÄ ³ve ones (O'Donoghue
and Rabin, 1999a). While extremely appealing, the empirical validity of this distinction has not
been tested. This paper introduces the ¯rst (as far as we know) empirical proxy for naÄ ³vit¶ e,
comparing subjects' self-reported procrastinating behavior with their own actual behavior and
¯nd that, as predicted by theory, the behavior of naÄ ³ve individuals does di®er from that of
non-naÄ ³ve ones.
Put together these results provide a strong empirical support for O'Donoghue and Rabin
(1999a) and Choi et al. (2005).
19A Instructions and Experimental Procedures
A Experimental procedures
The experiment was run during Tuesday the 3rd and Thursday the 5th of October 2006. Stu-
dents were randomly assigned to participate in one of the two days. Two sessions were run
each day during the afternoon, one starting at 1 o'clock and the other one at 3 o'clock. Due to
scheduling con°icts with other activities, all national students (US citizens) participated in the
1 o'clock sessions and international students in the 3 o'clock sessions.
Upon arrival students received a set of materials which included their $20 show-up fee and a
unique randomly assigned number that is used to identify each subject. Once all students were
seated, the experimenter reminded them not to communicate with one another and that their
interaction with others will remain anonymous. Thereafter, students were asked to sign various
consent forms. Consenting to the di®erent aspects of the study is voluntary and subjects have
the option to opt out of the study at any time. The experiment was run with computers and
programmed with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). It lasted around one and a half hours.
B Instructions for the payment choice
As your last choice, you decide when to receive your payment. For each row below, choose the
amount and timing of your payment. If you choose to be paid now, a check will be delivered to
your mailfolder by the end of the day. If you choose to be paid later, the check will be delivered
to your mailfolder in two weeks time. One of the rows will be randomly selected by the computer
and that choice will be implemented.
[Example with earnings of $80]
1. Receive $80.00 today or receive $80.00 in two weeks
2. Receive $80.00 today or receive $80.80 in two weeks
3. Receive $80.00 today or receive $81.60 in two weeks
4. Receive $80.00 today or receive $82.40 in two weeks
5. Receive $80.00 today or receive $83.20 in two weeks
6. Receive $80.00 today or receive $84.00 in two weeks
7. Receive $80.00 today or receive $84.80 in two weeks
8. Receive $80.00 today or receive $85.60 in two weeks
209. Receive $80.00 today or receive $86.40 in two weeks
10. Receive $80.00 today or receive $87.20 in two weeks
11. Receive $80.00 today or receive $88.00 in two weeks
12. Receive $80.00 today or receive $88.80 in two weeks
13. Receive $80.00 today or receive $89.60 in two weeks
C Instructions for the chocolate auction
As part of the LEAD GAME we are auctioning a large Toblerone milk chocolate bar (3.52
ounces). The chocolate will be given to the highest bidder at a price equal to the second highest
bid. Note that if you are the winner, the price will be deducted from your ¯nal earnings (if your
earnings are not enough to cover the price you will have to pay us the di®erence). The chocolate
will be delivered to the winner either now, in one week, or in two weeks (each is equally likely).
² If the bar of chocolate is to be delivered now: immediately at the end of the session. How
much money are you willing to bid for this bar of chocolate?
² If the bar of chocolate is to be delivered in one week: at the end of your LEAD class. How
much money are you willing to bid for this bar of chocolate?
² If the bar of chocolate is to be delivered in two weeks: at the end of your LEAD class.
How much money are you willing to bid for this bar of chocolate?
B Proofs
Lemma 1 The optimal cuto® rule is given by
c¤(¯;p;S;¹ c) =
p
(p¹ c)2 + 2(1 ¡ p)p(2 ¡ ¯)¯S¹ c ¡ p¹ c
(1 ¡ p)(2 ¡ ¯)
Proof. At the cuto® point c¤ the individual is indi®erent between cashing the check in the
current period or delaying the decision:
(8) c¤ = ¯[pS + (1 ¡ p)L(c¤)]:
21Since the probability that an individual cashes the check in a given period is c¤
¹ c , and if she does,
she pays an average cost of c¤
























(c¤)2 + 2p(¹ c ¡ c¤)S
2c¤ + 2p(¹ c ¡ c¤)
: (9)
Note that ¯ does not appear in L as the individual is evaluating tradeo®s between future periods
only. Substituting (9) into (8) and solving for c¤ gives (3).8
Proposition 1 If the check is not negligibly small, the lower the ¯ (i.e, the more impatient the
individual is) and the smaller the size of the check S, the more time an individual takes to cash
the check.
Proof. The time to cash the check is positive as long as c¤ < ¹ c, which holds if
(10) S <
2 ¡ (1 ¡ p)¯
2p¯
¹ c:
Since the right hand side of the equation is decreasing in ¯, it means that more impatient
individuals satisfy (10) more easily and thus are less likely to always cash the check in period














p¹ c + 2(1 ¡ p)(2 ¡ ¯)S ¡
p
(p¹ c)2 + 2(1 ¡ p)p(2 ¡ ¯)¯S¹ c
´
(1 ¡ p)(2 ¡ ¯)2p
(p¹ c)2 + 2(1 ¡ p)p(2 ¡ ¯)¯S¹ c
(12)





(1 ¡ p)((¹ c ¡ 2c¤)(c¤ + p(¹ c ¡ c¤)) ¡ 2(1 ¡ p)(¹ c ¡ c¤)c¤)
(c¤ + p(¹ c ¡ c¤))3
which is positive if c¤ <
p
1 + p
¹ c. Using (3) and given that @c¤=@¯ > 0 and @c¤=@S > 0, it follows
that:
(14) if S >










¤ > 0 otherwise the individual never cashes the check and eventually losses it incurring a cost
S > 0.
8The substitution gives a quadratic equation. We use the upper root so that c
¤ > 0.
22Note that, for reasonable parameter values, (14) is easily satis¯ed even by a small S relative
to ¹ c. For example if ¯ ¸ 0:5 and p · 0:2 then (14) holds if S > 1
2¹ c. However, the clearest
evidence that this inequality is satis¯ed in our sample is that if it is not, it implies that a large
percentage of subjects never cash the check. To see this, note that the probability that a subject





















Given that P(c¤) is decreasing in c¤ if (14) is not satis¯ed, it is easy to verify that the minimum






¼ 51%. This is much higher than the actual 7% who
did not cash the check
Corollary 1 Even if o®ered a positive interest rate r, an individual with ¯ = 1 will not neces-
sarily delay receiving the check.
Proof. An individual with ¯ = 1 will chose the check today if c0 < S¡¾(S+rS).9 Thus, there
is a positive probability that the individual will take the check today as long as the righthand







It is not hard to ¯nd parameter values for which (16) holds. For example, if S = $100, ¹ c = $50,
and p = 0:01, an individual with ¯ = 1 has a positive probability of taking the check today as
long as r < 0:090
Proposition 2 The lower is the interest rate o®ered r and the lower is ¯ (i.e, the more im-
patient a player), the higher is the probability that an individual will prefer a check right away
rather than next period.
Proof. The probability that an individual prefers a check today is given by
9When ¯ = 1, the second inequality in (6) is never satis¯ed.
23(17) ¦ =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if ¯ > ¹ ¯
S ¡ ¯¾(S + rS)
¹ c
if ¯ < ¯ < ¹ ¯
1 if ¯ < ¯





S ¡ ¹ c
¾(S + rS)
¶
and ¹ ¯ =
S
¾(S + rS)
We ¯rst show that the probability of taking the check today is decreasing in r and ¯ for the




p¹ c(S ¡ c¤) ¡ 1
2(1 ¡ p)c¤2
(c¤ + p(¹ c ¡ c¤))2
Using (3) and solving for c¤ indicates that (18) is positive if
c¤ ·
p
(p¹ c)2 + 2(1 ¡ p)pS¹ c ¡ p¹ c
(1 ¡ p)
which holds as long as ¯ · 1. Combining this with the positive sign of (11) and (12) ensures
that @¦=@r < 0 and @¦=@¯ < 0.
Note that, since (11) and (18) are positive, it must be the case that (¹ ¯ ¡¯) and (¯ ¡¯) are
decreasing in r. In other words, a high r or ¯ makes it more likely that the individual never
takes the check today and less likely that she always takes the check today.
Finally we show that if ¯ is close to ¹ ¯ then (¹ ¯ ¡ ¯) is decreasing in ¯, and if ¯ is close to ¯
then the same is true for (¯ ¡¯). In the case of (¹ ¯ ¡¯) and (¯ ¡¯) when S ¡ ¹ c > (1¡p)¾(S),
this follows immediately from the fact that (12) and (18) are both positive. For (¯ ¡ ¯) when
S ¡ ¹ c < (1 ¡ p)¾(S), this is true as long as @¯=@¯ < 1. Unfortunately we are unable to
solve this inequality for a manageable analytical solution. Therefore, to show that this holds
in the experiment we calculated @¯=@¯ for the following parameter values: p 2 [0:005;0:995],
S 2 [1;300], ¹ c 2 [1;300], and r 2 [0;0:15], when ¯ = ¯.10 We ¯nd a maximum value for @¯=@¯
of 0.0235 which is less than 1. In other words, if ¯ is close to any of the two threshold values,
a high ¯ lowers the ¹ ¯ threshold making it more likely that the individual never takes the check
today and increases the ¯ threshold making less likely that she always takes the check today
Corollary 2 For high interest rates r there is a negative relation between the amount of the
check S and the probability of accepting a check right away rather than the following period. For
low interest rates this relation is positive.
10Calculations where done in steps of 0:005 for p and r, and steps of 1 for S and ¹ c. They are available upon
request.
24Proof. From (17) one can see that, as long as ¯ < ¯ < ¹ ¯, the relation between S and the












Thus, if ¯(@¾(S+rS)=@S) < 1 the relation between ¦ and S is positive, otherwise it is negative.





1 + r ¡ 1
2c¤
S
c¤ + p(¹ c ¡ c¤)
c¤ +
(1 + r)S ¡ 1
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p¯(1 + r)¹ c
p
(p¹ c)2 + 2(1 ¡ p)p(2 ¡ ¯)¯(1 + r)S¹ c
which is clearly positive as 1
2c¤
S < (1+r) and 1
2c¤ < (1+r)S. The derivative of @¾(S +rS)=@S












(c¤ + p(¹ c ¡ c¤))3 p¹ cc¤
S +
(1 + r)S ¡ 1
2c¤









p¹ c + (1 ¡ p)(2 ¡ ¯)¯(1 + r)S
3 p
(p¹ c)2 + 2(1 ¡ p)p(2 ¡ ¯)¯(1 + r)S¹ c
¯(p¹ c)2
which again is positive as 0 < c¤
Sr < 1, as well as S > c¤ > Sc¤
S and 2(1 + r) > c¤
S. In other
words, @¦=@S switches from being (weakly) positive to (weakly) negative as r increases if for
a low r it holds that ¯(@¾(S + rS)=@S) < 1. In this case, there is an r¤ such that for r > r¤
it holds that @¦=@S · 0 and for r < r¤ it holds that @¦=@S ¸ 0.11 The precise value of r¤ is
given by the r that solves @¦=@S = 0. Although we did not ¯nd a meaningful expression for
r¤, it is easy to calculate it for various parameter values. For example, if S = $80, ¹ c = $20,
p = 0:03, and ¯ = 1, then ¯ = 0:937, ¹ ¯ = 1:061, and r¤ = 0:033. Similarly, if S = $135, ¹ c = $35,
p = 0:1, and ¯ = 0:9, then ¯ = 0:787, ¹ ¯ = 1:002, and r¤ = 0:127
Proposition 3 Generally for ¯ < 1 the probability that a naÄ ³ve individual prefers a check right
away rather than next period is less than the probability of a sophisticated individual with the
same characteristics. All the other comparative static is the same as for sophisticated individuals.
11Note that for very low and very high values of r, there might not be a relationship between ¦ and S as ¯
can fall outside the thresholds ¯ and ¹ ¯. Thus, this corollary applies strictly only when comparing intermediate
values of r.
25Proof. Lets de¯ne ¯e (¾e(S;¯e)) as the threshold value of ¯ below which an individual with
belief ¯e strictly prefers to cash the check today:









Furthermore, note that since (18) and (12) are both positive for 0 < p < 1 and 0 < ¯ · 1, it
follows that @¾=@¯ > 0.
If S¡¹ c > (1¡p)¾e(S;1), it is clear that an individual for whom ¯ < 1 has a lower probability
of choosing the check today if she is naÄ ³ve since
(23)
S ¡ ¯¾e(S + rS;¯)
¹ c
>
S ¡ ¯¾e(S + rS;1)
¹ c
:
If (S ¡ ¹ c) < (1 ¡ p)¾e(S;1) then the same can be said as long as ¯ > ¯e (¾e(S;1)). In this
case, either ¯ > ¯e (¾e(S;¯)) and (23) holds, or ¯e (¾e(S;¯)) > ¯ and the probability of cashing
the check today for a sophisticated individual equals 1 and for a naÄ ³ve individual it is strictly
less than 1.
If (S ¡ ¹ c) < (1 ¡ p)¾e(S;1), ¯ < ¯e (¾e(S;1)), and ¯ < ¯e (¾e(S;¯)) then the individual
cashes the check today with probability 1 irrespective of whether she is sophisticated or naÄ ³ve.
Finally, if (S ¡ ¹ c) < (1 ¡ p)¾e(S;1), ¯ < ¯e (¾e(S;1)), and ¯ > ¯e (¾e(S;¯)) then the
individual cashes the check today with probability 1 if she is naÄ ³ve and with probability less
than 1 if she is sophisticated. Thus, this is the only scenario in which a sophisticated individual
is more likely cash the check than a naÄ ³ve one. In order to assess the likelihood that it occurs we
calculated for various values of S, ¹ c, p, and r, the range of ¯s for which this scenario's conditions
hold. We used the following parameter values: p 2 [0:005;0:995], S 2 [1;300], ¹ c 2 [1;300], and
r 2 [0;0:15].10 We ¯nd that the largest range occurs for p = 0:585, K = 201, S = 240, and
r = 0:15, where this scenario occurs for ¯ 2 [0:327;0:332]. If we further restrict the search to
cases where ¯ ¸ 0:5, we ¯nd the largest range is ¯ 2 [0:500;0:504] for p = 0:375, K = 125,
S = 84, and r = 0:15.
Given the very small range of values for which a sophisticate individual has a higher proba-
bility of choosing the check today compared to a naÄ ³ve individual with the same characteristics,
we conclude that generally, naÄ ³ve individuals are less likely to accept the check right away.
It is easy to see that the other comparative statics hold for naÄ ³ve individuals. Proposition 1
holds as check cashing is independent of the level of naÄ ³vit¶ e. Proposition 2 holds in an even more
straightforward manner as ¾e(S;1) and ¾e(S +rS;1) are independent of the value of ¯. Lastly,
corollaries 1 and 2 depend only on ¯ and not on ¯e and hence also hold for naÄ ³ve individuals
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28Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics for all the variables used in this paper. The two-week
discount rate is inferred from a series of choices subjects made between getting $x today and
$x(1 + r) in two weeks (r 2 [0;0:12]). The value reported is the level of r at which a subject
switched from money today to money in two weeks. The two-week discount rate · 1 is a dummy
equal to one if a subject behaves as an exponential discounter, i.e. she chooses to switch at
r = 0 or r = 1. Chocolate now/in one week/in two weeks indicate the subjects' bids in US$
for a Tobblerone chocolate bar to be delivered at one of the respective dates (bids were for a
second-price auction). ¯ Chocolate is the value of the parameter ¯ that would rationalize the
subjects' bids for the chocolate at the three di®erent delivery times. It is calculated by taking
the ratio of the bid for one week to today and dividing it by the ratio of the bid for two weeks to
one week (see Laibson, 1994). Weeks to cash the check equals the number of weeks the subject
took to cash the check he/she received. Days to answer 1st survey equals the number of days the
subject took to answer the mandatory survey. Days to answer 2nd survey equals the number of
days the subject took to answer the voluntary survey. Self-reported procrastinator is a dummy
equal to one if a subject answered yes to the question \Do you tend to procrastinate?" NaÄ ³ve
procrastinator (survey) is a dummy equal to one if a subject answers no to the abovementioned
question and at the same time took more time to complete the survey than the median subject.
NaÄ ³ve procrastinator (survey & check) is a dummy equal to one if a subject answers negatively
to the abovementioned question and at the same time took more time to complete the survey
and to cash the check than the median subject. Money at stake equals the amount of money
in US$ upon which the subject made the decisions used to calculate his/her two-week discount
rate. CRT score is the number of correct answers to a series of 4 questions designed to measure
a subject's cognitive reasoning skills (see Frederik, 2005). Club memberships equals the number
of business school clubs a subject is a member of. Trust is a dummy equal to one if a subject
answers \Most people can be trusted" to the question \Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?". The other
answers are \Can't be too careful" and \Don't know". Female is a dummy equal to one if the
subject is a woman. Married is a dummy equal to one if a subject was married at the time of
the experiment. Married male/female is a dummy equal to one if the subject was a married
man/woman.
29Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
Measures of Impatience
Two-week discount rate (money) 5:07 4:00 4:40 0:00 13:00 460
Two-week discount rate · 1 0:36 0:00 0:48 0:00 1:00 460
Chocolate now 1:86 1:00 2:47 0:00 20:00 460
Chocolate in one week 1:31 1:00 1:98 0:00 20:00 460
Chocolate in two weeks 1:12 0:50 1:97 0:00 21:00 460
¯ Chocolate 1:09 1:00 1:45 0:03 25:00 323
¯ Chocolate = 1 0:30 0:00 0:46 0:00 1:00 323
Measures of Procrastination
Weeks to cash the check 3:70 2:14 4:36 0:00 29:29 429
Days to answer 1st survey 8:96 10:47 5:05 0:37 17:08 460
Days to answer 2nd survey 32:69 29:48 16:84 0:07 69:27 255
Self-reported procrastinator 0:70 1:00 0:46 0:00 1:00 460
NaÄ ³ve procrastinator (survey) 0:11 0:00 0:31 0:00 1:00 460
NaÄ ³ve procrastinator (survey & check) 0:07 0:00 0:25 0:00 1:00 460
Other variables
Money at stake 83:24 78:38 54:34 2:00 260:00 460
CRT score 2:45 3:00 1:33 0:00 4:00 460
Club memberships 3:45 4:00 1:42 0:00 5:00 437
Trust 0:53 1:00 0:50 0:00 1:00 460
Female 0:30 0:00 0:46 0:00 1:00 437
Married 0:27 0:00 0:45 0:00 1:00 423
Married male 0:30 0:00 0:46 0:00 1:00 297
Married female 0:21 0:00 0:41 0:00 1:00 126
.
30Table 2: Procrastination
The dependent variable is the number of days it took the subject to cash the check he/she
received. Money at stake is the logarithm of the amount of money in US$ upon which the
subject made the decisions used to calculate his/her two-week discount rate. Club memberships
equals the number of business school clubs a subject is a member of. Trust is a dummy equal
to one if a subject answers \Most people can be trusted" to the question \Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with
people?". The other answers are \Can't be too careful" and \Don't know". Female is a dummy
equal to one if the subject is a woman. Married is a dummy equal to one if a subject was
married at the time of the experiment. Married male/female is a dummy equal to one if the
subject was a married man/woman. Days to answer 1st survey equals the number of days the
subject took to answer the mandatory survey. Days to answer 2nd survey equals the number of
days the subject took to answer the voluntary survey. The sample is reduced to 437 and then
further to 423 subjects, because some did not consent to the treatment of their career data.
This table reports OLS estimates and robust standard errors. The symbols ¤;¤¤ ;¤¤¤ indicate
statistical signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
31Weeks to cash the check as the dependent variable
I II III IV V VI
Money at stake -1.527¤¤¤ -1.512¤¤¤ -1.545¤¤¤ -1.555¤¤¤ -1.523¤¤¤ -1.505¤¤¤
(0.485) (0.491) (0.483) (0.478) (0.484) (0.472)
Club memberships 0.493¤¤ 0.470¤¤ 0.478¤¤ 0.489¤¤ 0.556¤¤
(0.231) (0.237) (0.236) (0.233) (0.233)
Married male -1.886¤¤ -1.803¤¤ -1.641¤ -1.722¤¤
(0.848) (0.854) (0.840) (0.861)
Married female 0.469 0.533 0.735 1.029
(1.788) (1.766) (1.786) (1.788)
Female -0.390 -0.329 -0.181 -0.329
(0.929) (0.933) (0.918) (0.923)
Trust 0.966 0.962 1.008
(0.748) (0.739) (0.733)
Days to answer 1st survey 0.210¤¤¤ 0.172¤¤
(0.068) (0.069)
Days to answer 2nd survey 0.036¤¤
(0.017)
Constant 11.735¤¤¤ 9.970¤¤¤ 10.583¤¤¤ 10.033¤¤¤ 7.887¤¤¤ 6.177¤¤
(2.118) (2.385) (2.425) (2.391) (2.559) (2.464)
R2 0.035¤¤¤ 0.043¤¤¤ 0.055¤¤¤ 0.059¤¤¤ 0.078¤¤¤ 0.089¤¤¤
Obs. 437 437 423 423 423 423
.
32Table 3: Measures of Impatience
The dependent variable is the subjects' two-week discount rate, which we inferred from a series
of choices subjects made between getting $x today and $x(1 + r) in two weeks (r 2 [0;0:12]).
The value reported is the level of r at which a subject switched from money today to money
in two weeks. ¯ chocolate is the value of the parameter ¯ that would rationalize the subjects'
bids for a Tobblerone chocolate bar at three di®erent delivery times (today, in one week, and in
two weeks). It is calculated by taking the ratio of the bid for one week to today and dividing it
by the ratio of the bid for two weeks to one week (see Laibson, 1994). Money at stake equals
the logarithm amount of money in US$ upon which the subjects made the decisions used to
calculate their two-week discount rate. In column I we lose 137 observations because at least
one of the bids was equal to zero. In column II we restrict the sample only to subjects who bid
at least $1 for the chocolate to be delivered right away. The table reports Tobit estimates where
the left hand side is censored at r · 1 and r ¸ 13. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
The symbols ¤;¤¤ ;¤¤¤ indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Two-week discount rate as the dependent variable
I II
¯ Chocolate -0.268 -0.451¤
(0.260) (0.272)





Log likelihood -690.055 -568.760
Obs. 323 265
33Table 4: Impatience and Procrastination
The dependent variable is the subjects' two-week discount rate, which we inferred from a series
of choices subjects made between getting $x today and $x(1+r) in two weeks (r 2 [0;0:12]). The
value reported is the level of r at which a subject switched from money today to money in two
weeks. Weeks to cash the check equals the number of weeks the subject took to cash the check
he/she received. In the censored version of this variable we attribute to subjects who did not
cash the check the highest number of weeks. Money at stake equals the logarithm of the amount
of money in US$ upon which the subjects made the decisions used to calculate their two-week
discount rate. CRT score is the number of correct answers to a series of 4 questions designed
to measure a subject's cognitive reasoning skills (see Frederik, 2005). Club memberships equals
the number of business school clubs a subject is a member of. Trust is a dummy equal to one if
a subject answers \Most people can be trusted" to the question \Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?".
The other answers are \Can't be too careful" and \Don't know". The table presents Tobit
regressions censoring at r · 1 and r ¸ 13. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The
symbols ¤;¤¤ ;¤¤¤ indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
Two-week discount rate as the dependent variable
I II III IV
Weeks to cash the check 0.036
(0.083)




Money at stake -2.615¤¤¤ -2.774¤¤¤ -2.794¤¤¤ -2.771¤¤¤
(0.519) (0.485) (0.483) (0.480)




Constant 14.365¤¤¤ 14.927¤¤¤ 17.096¤¤¤ 17.680¤¤¤
(2.298) (2.169) (2.291) (2.297)
Â2 25.582¤¤¤ 36.135¤¤¤ 44.713¤¤¤ 49.078¤¤¤
Log likelihood -925.083 -988.636 -983.903 -982.305
Obs. 429 460 460 460
34Table 5: Di®erent Measures of Procrastination
The dependent variable is the subjects' two-week discount rate, which we inferred from a series
of choices subjects made between getting $x today and $x(1 + r) in two weeks (r 2 [0;0:12]).
The value reported is the level of r at which a subject switched from money today to money
in two weeks. Weeks to cash the check equals the number of weeks the subject took to cash
the check he/she received. In the censored version of this variable we attribute to subjects
who did not cash the check the highest number of weeks. Days to answer 1st survey equals
the number of days the subject took to answer the mandatory survey (which occurred before
the experiment). Days to answer 2nd survey equals the number of days the subject took to
answer the voluntary survey (which occurred after the experiment). Money at stake equals the
logarithm of the amount of money in US$ upon which the subjects made the decisions used
to calculate their two-week discount rate. CRT score is the number of correct answers to a
series of 4 questions designed to measure a subject's cognitive reasoning skills (see Frederik,
2005). Trust is a dummy equal to one if a subject answers \Most people can be trusted" to
the question \Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can't be too careful in dealing with people?". The other answers are \Can't be too careful" and
\Don't know". Columns I and II present Tobit regressions censoring at r · 1 and r ¸ 13. In
addition, in Column III we instrument the number of weeks to cash the check with the days
to answer the 1st and 2nd surveys. Standard errors are in parentheses. The symbols ¤;¤¤ ;¤¤¤
indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
35Two-week discount rate as the dependent variable
I II III
Days to answer 1st survey 0.122¤
(0.073)
Days to answer 2nd survey 0.036¤¤
(0.017)




Money at stake -2.851¤¤¤ -2.830¤¤¤ -1.573¤
(0.477) (0.478) (0.836)
CRT score -0.803¤¤¤ -0.767¤¤¤ -1.002¤¤¤
(0.272) (0.272) (0.361)
Trust -1.307¤ -1.263¤ -1.800¤
(0.745) (0.744) (0.970)
Constant 17.144¤¤¤ 16.284¤¤¤ 9.105¤
(2.316) (2.479) (5.386)
Â2 48.015¤¤¤ 50.790¤¤¤ 41.516¤¤¤
Log likelihood -981.991 -981.161
Obs. 460 460 460
.
36Table 6: NaÄ ³vit¶ e
The dependent variable is the subjects' two-week discount rate, which we inferred from a series
of choices subjects made between getting $x today and $x(1 + r) in two weeks (r 2 [0;0:12]).
The value reported is the level of r at which a subject switched from money today to money
in two weeks. Weeks to cash the check equals the number of weeks the subject took to cash
the check he/she received. In the censored version of this variable we attribute to subjects who
did not cash the check the highest number of weeks. Money at stake equals the logarithm of
the amount of money in US$ upon which the subjects made the decisions used to calculate
their two-week discount rate. CRT score is the number of correct answers to a series of 4
questions designed to measure a subject's cognitive reasoning skills (see Frederik, 2005). Trust
is a dummy equal to one if a subject answers \Most people can be trusted" to the question
\Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too
careful in dealing with people?". The other answers are \Can't be too careful" and \Don't
know". NaÄ ³ve procrastinator (survey) is a dummy equal to one if a subject answered no to the
question \Do you tend to procrastinate?" and at the same time took more time to complete the
survey than the median subject. NaÄ ³ve procrastinator (survey & check) is a dummy equal to one
if a subject answers negatively to the abovementioned question and at the same time took more
time to complete the survey and to cash the check than the median subject. Tobit regressions
censoring at r · 1 and r ¸ 13. In both columns we instrument the number of weeks to cash
the check with the days to answer the 1st and 2nd surveys. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The symbols ¤;¤¤ ;¤¤¤ indicate statistical signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level.
37Two-week discount rate as the dependent variable
I II




Money at stake -1.323 -1.178
(0.924) (1.071)


















Impatience is the subjects' two-week discount rate, which we inferred from a series of choices
subjects made between getting $x today and $x(1 + r) in two weeks (r 2 [0;0:12]). The value
reported is the level of r at which a subject switched from money today to money in two weeks.
Money at stake equals the amount of money in US$ upon which the subjects made the decisions
used to calculate their two-week discount rate. The red line indicates the best-¯tting polynomial
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39Figure 2: Procrastination
Procrastination is calculated as the number of weeks the subject took to cash the check he/she
received. We use the censored version of this variable in which subjects who did not cash the
check are given a value equal to the highest number of weeks. Money at stake equals the amount
of money in US$ upon which the subjects made the decisions used to calculate their two-week
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40Figure 3: ¯ of Chocolate
¯ of Chocolate is calculated as the value of the parameter ¯ that would rationalize the subjects
bids for a Tobblerone chocolate bar at three di®erent delivery times (today, in one week, and in
two weeks). It is calculated by taking the ratio of the bid for one week to today and dividing it
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